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The goal of this paper is to account for the behavior of anaphora in the context 
of disjunction. There are two distinct sets of data to account for which, following 
Groenendijk and Stokhof ( 1 990), I call "internal" and "external" anaphora. 
Internal anaphora is anaphora between disjuncts, the possibilities for which are 
illustrated in ( 1 )  and (2) : 1 
( 1 )  #Either Jones owns a bicycle, or it' s  broken.2 
(2) Either there' s  no bathroom in the house, or it' s in a funny place. 
External anaphora is anaphora between a disjunctive expression of any syntactic 
type, and a pronoun outside that expression, generally in a following sentence. 
Some examples are given in (3)-(5) :  
(3)  Either a soprano or an alto will sing an aria. Then she will lead the 
audience in the national anthem. 
(4) Jane either borrowed a car or rented a truck to get to Boston. #It broke 
down on the way. 
(5) Either a squirrel has got into the attic, or a bird is building a nest up there. 
We' l l  have to get it out. 
Each set of data requires a somewhat different explanation, but both explanations 
wil l  follow from quite natural assumptions about the function which disjunction 
fulfil ls  in discourse . 
] .  Internal  Anaphora 
The internal anaphora data are wel l  known from the l iterature. as is the puzzle 
they present. The puzzle, in brief, is this. Examples l ike ( I )  above indicate that 
indefinites in one disjunct cannot serve as antecedents to pronouns in another. In 
addition, it is generally assumed. on the basis of examples like (6), that indefinites 
in the scope of negation are inaccessible to following pronouns: 
(6) George doesn't  own a car. #It' s blue. 
In "bathroom sentences" like (2), the indefinite is not only in a different disjunct 
to the pronoun, but also falls under the scope of negation . We would therefore 
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expect anapbora between the two to be doubly bad; but in fact, it is perfectly 
acceptable. 
Let me begin my explanation by making two additional observations. 
First, it is not the case that all anaphora is blocked by negation. Consider (7) and 
(8): 
(7) This hospital has a maternity ward. It is very well run. 
(8) This hospital does not have a maternity ward. It was closed due to lack of 
funds. 
It is generally agreed that the anaphora in (8), where the indefinite falls under the 
scope of negation, is of a different type to the anaphora in (7). Nonetheless, it is 
clear that the pronoun in (8) is interpreted on the basis of the content of the first 
clause, in particular, of the indefinite NP. 
The second observation is that the same kind of infelicity which occurs in 
( I )  also occurs in the absence of anaphora. Compare ( I ), repeated here, with (9) 
and ( 1 0): 
( I )  #Either Jones owns a bicycle, or it' s  broken. 
(9) #Either Jones owns a bicycle, or she owns a broken bicycle. 
( 1 0) #Either Jones owns a bicycle, or she hides every bicycle she owns. 
All of these seem equally peculiar, but we obviously cannot attribute the 
peculiarity of (9) and ( 1 0) to the impossibility of anaphora. 
Note further that the infelicity of ( 1 )  seems different in kind to that of 
( I  I )  #Every man ran away. He was afraid. 
The pronoun in this example cannot be interpreted on the basis of the l inguistic 
context. Naive speakers object to the sequence because the pronoun "doesn't  refer 
to anything . "  In contrast, the pronoun in ( I )  does have an intuitively clear 
interpretation. Naive speakers agree that it is " the bicycle Jones owns. " The 
problem with ( I ) , as with (9) and ( 1 0) ,  is that the disjunction as a whole just 
doesn't  make any sense. Given the similarity between the anaphora and the non­
anaphora cases, it is c learly desirable to give a single account for both. 
This is what I wi l l  do here. In my account, I wi l l  suggest that anaphora 
of the type il lustrated in (8) is freely allowed between disjuncts, but in cases l ike 
( I )  results in disjunctions which are infelicitous for the same reason that (9) and 
( 1 0) are: they violate a strong pragmatic constraint on disjunction. 
1. 2. The Disjunction Constraint 
The function of a disjunctive sentence is to present alternatives. A disj unction 
offers characterizations of (at least) two different possible states of affairs, and 
asserts that at least one of these holds in the actual world.  Now, reconsider 
example (9), repeated here : 
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(9) #Either Jones owns a bicycle, or she owns a broken bicycle. 
Note that the second disjunct of (9) entails the first. This means that whenever 
the world accords with the state of affairs described by the second disjunct, it also 
accords with the state of affairs described by the first. In other words, (9) does 
not present true alternatives; it does not present information about two distinct 
possible states of affairs. (9) seems to be ruled out because it does not do what 
disjunctions are supposed to do. To characterize this infelicitiy, let us say that 
disjunctions in which one disjunct entails the other are ruled out.3 
This constraint is also responsible for the infelicity of the anaphora 
examples. Recall sentence ( 1 ), repeated here: 
( 1 )  #Either Jones owns a bicycle, o r  it's broken. 
I noted above that intuitively, the pronoun in the second disjunct of ( 1 )  is 
interpreted as "the bicycle Jones owns. " It is this intuition which the various "E­
type" theories of pronoun interpretation attempt to capture. These theories, 
ranging from the syntactically constrained proposals made by Evans ( 1 977, 1 980) 
and developed in Neale ( 1 990), to the "pragmatic" account suggested in Heim 
( 1 990) and developed in Stone ( 1 992), all have a consequence in common. All 
of these theories assign to the pronoun in ( 1 )  an interpretation which entail s  the 
existence of a bicycle owned by Jones, and therefore that Jones owns a bicycle. 
Consequently, all of these theories predict that the second disjunct entails  the first. 
Given the observations made above, this means that although the pronoun itself 
is interpretable, the disjunction as a whole is ruled out. 
Let me make this explanation a little more concrete by introducing a 
formal framework. I adopt here the basic DRT framework of Kamp and Reyle 
( 1 993) .  into which I incorporate an E-type interpretation strategy .4 Following 
Kamp and Reyle, I represent disj unctions of the form [A or B) (where A and B 
may be expressions of any syntactic type) with a disjunctive condition of the form 
KJ v K1, where each Kn is itself a DRS . Accessibil ity relations and verification 
conditions are straightforward. I assume that discourse referents in the universe 
of any disjunct � are inaccessible from any other, or from any superordinate 
condition,5 and that the verification conditions assign to or the truth conditions of 
inclusive disjunction. 
Let us see, then, how the interpretation of ( 1 )  proceeds. At the first stage 
of DRS construction, a disjunctive condition is entered into the main DRS, and the 
content of each disjunct is entered into a sub-DRS. The first disjunct is reduced 
in the standard way, producing the DRS shown in ( 1 2) :  
( 1 2) I I I [x) [bicycle(x) ,  Jane owns x ] v [ ] [ it ' s  broken] I 
We now come to the pronoun in the second disjunct. What we expect to do is to 
use an old referent to translate it. so establ ishing an anaphoric l ink. But in this 
case, no such referent is accessible. We therefore employ a rescue strategy. We 
introduce a new referent, but We look for old information about some entity 
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already in the discourse representation, and use that information to constrain the 
mappings from this new referent to individuals in the world. Formally, this is 
achieved by taking conditions on an existing discourse referent, and applying them 
to the new one. Thus, we satisfy the familiarity requirement of definites by using 
old conditions, instead of an old variable. Application of this strategy produces 
the complete DRS shown in ( 1 3) :  
( 1 3) [ ] [ [x] [bicycle(x), Jane owns x ] v [y] [bicycle(y), Jane owns y, 
broken(y)]] 
My assumption here is that although discourse referents in one disjunct are 
inaccessible to pronouns in another, the informational content expressed by each 
disjunct is accessible, and can be used in constructing the representation. 
The DRS in ( 1 3) shows clearly why the infelicitous disjunctions involving 
anaphora reduce to the non-anaphora cases in which one disjunct entails the other. 
( l 3) is, in fact, just the representation we would get for (9); the second disjunct 
of ( 1 3) entails the first. Thus, as I suggested above, the problem is not the 
interpretation of the pronoun, but the disjunction itself. In any disjunction of the 
form: 
( 1 4) [s . . .  NPj [-def] . . . .  ] or [s · . .  Proll; . . . .  ] 
the interpretation strategy just outlined is the only one available. And in every 
such case, this strategy will give rise to the same kind of infelicity. The only 
exception to this is the case in which the indefinite falls  under the scope of 
negation, that is, in bathroom sentences. 
The interpretation of a bathroom sentence l ike ( 1 5) proceeds in just the 
same way. We introduce a disjunctive condition, and reduce the first disj unct. 
When we encounter the pronoun in the second disj unct, we look for an accessible 
discourse referent via which to interpret it. When we find that there is  no 
accessible referent, we instead introduce a new referent, and constrain its reference 
by using old conditions : the conditions from the first disj unct. The negation, 
however, is not copied, as it is not part of a condition applied to a referent. The 
result is the DRS in ( 1 6) .  As the first disjunct in this  DRS is negated, the shared 
conditions do not create an entailment relation between the clauses. Consequently, 
the disjunction is felic itous. 
( 1 5) Either there ' s  no bathroom in this house, or it 's in a strange place. 
( 1 6) I H -, (x1(bathroom(x), in-the-house(x)l v (y1[bathroom(y),  in-the-
house(y), in-a-strange-place(y) 1 ) 
I do not wish to suggest that this anaphora strategy is governed by a strict 
rule. Essential ly, it involves the selection by the hearer of some salient 
information for the interpretation of an otherwise uninterpretable definite. The 
default strategy is to look at the immediate linguistic context--the preceding 
clause--and to select as much relevant information as is available. Consequently, 
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in the usual case, all of the descriptive content of the antecedent clause is used to 
construct an interpretation for the pronoun. This seems reasonable, given that the 
point of condition copying is to ensure that the new discourse referent will be 
mapped to the same individuals in the world as the old one; if they share all the 
same conditions, this will be guaranteed. 
This, then, is all that is needed for the account of internal anaphora: the 
availability of an E-type strategy of pronoun interpretation, plus the recognition 
that disjunction itself is subject to certain constraints. We should observe, though, 
that the constraint on disjunction is more complex than I have suggested so far. 
( 1 7) and ( 1 8) show a different pattern to the examples considered above: 
( 1 7) #Either Henry owns a car and Cleo owns a truck, or Henry owns a 
Japanese car (and Cleo doesn't own a truck). 
( 1 8) #Either Henry lives in England and he owns a house, or he lives in 
London (and he doesn't own a house). 
These examples show that in a disjunction whose disjuncts themselves consist of 
a conjunction of clauses, if any clause in one disjunct entails a clause in another 
disjunct, the disjunction is ruled out. Entailment between the disjuncts as a whole 
is not required in order for the disjunction to be ruled out; entailment between 
sub-parts of the disjuncts suffices. 
There is surely some underlying principle at work here which produces 
these effects. In the scope of this paper, I cannot pursue the question of what 
exactly this principle might be. However, for our purposes here, the relevant 
observation is that the anaphora case behaves in just the same way : 
( 1 9) #Either Jane owns a bicycle and she ' s  happy, or i t 's  broken and she' s  
unhappy. 
This  is predicted by my account, according to which the two cases are essentially 
identical . These more complicated examples thus provide further evidence that 
what has been thought of as an anaphora problem should be seen as a question 
about disjunction itself. 
2. External Anaphora 
Disjunctions of different syntactic types show sl ight d ifferences with respect to 
external anaphora, but the same principles govern the anaphora in each case. I 
shall begin with the case of NP disjunction, and illustrate these principles. I will 
then go on to discuss clausal and VP disjunction. 
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2. 1. NP disjunction 
As (20) and (2 1 )  illustrate, anaphora is possible between a disjunction of indefinite 
NPs in one sentence and a pronoun in the following sentence. The disjunctive NP 
may be in either subject or object position. 
(20) Either a soprano or an alto will sing. She will stand on that platform. 
(2 1 ) George will sing either an aria or a ballad. It will have German lyrics. 
The pronouns in these examples, though, are not anaphoric on either subordinate 
NP, but on the disjunctive NP as a whole. Consider (20). She cannot be 
interpreted as anaphoric on either a soprano or on an alto. It can only mean 
something like "whoever sings. " I dub this the "whoever/whatever" interpretation. 
It might be thought that anaphora to a subordinate NP is ruled out in (20) 
because of an unresolvable ambiguity: there is no way to determine whether the 
pronoun is intended as anaphoric on a soprano or on an alto, and so neither is 
possible. However, this reading is ruled out even when there is no potential 
ambiguity, as in (22). 
(22) Either a soprano or a bass will sing. #He will stand on that platform. 
Any ambiguity would be resolved here by the gender clash between he and a 
soprano, but nonetheless, the pronoun cannot be understood as anaphoric on a 
bass. Moreover, as whoever sings may be either male or female, he cannot be 
given the "whoever/whatever interpretation. " So the pronoun in this case is not 
felicitous under any interpretation. I have found, however, that speakers who 
general ly accept they as a gender-neutral singular anaphor also accept (23) under 
the "whoever/whatever" interpretation. 
(23) Either a soprano or a bass wil l  sing. They' l l  stand on that platform. 
Examples (20)-(22) contrast interestingly with cases in which one or both 
indefinites are replaced by proper names, as in (24)-(26). In these cases, the 
pronoun cannot be given a "whoever/whatever" interpretation, but it can now be 
interpreted as anaphoric on a particular subordinate NP, as long as there is no 
ambiguity. 
(24) Either Jane or Maud will sing. #She wil l  stand on that platform. 
(25) Either Jane or a soprano will sing. #She has / will have a beautiful voice. 
(26) a. Either Jane or George will sing. HE will also play the piano. 
b. Jane and George wi l l  sing. HE wil l  play the piano too. 
To make this anaphoric reading natural, the pronoun needs to be slightly stressed. 
(Strong contrastive stress is not necessary; the pronoun simply must not be 
deaccented. )  Whatever the reason for this, the same holds in the case of anaphora 
to a subordinate NP in a conjunction such as (26b). 
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This pattern is not peculiar to proper names. Specific indefinites behave 
in just the same way: 
(27) The concert will be opened by a soprano or an alto. She will stand on that 
platform. 
(28) The concert will be opened by a famous mezzo who started her career as 
a violist, or a young soprano who recently sang at the Met. #She will stand 
on that platform. 
(29) The concert will be opened by a famous mezzo who started her career as 
a violist, or a young Welsh baritone who recently sang at the Met. HE is 
a very interesting performer. 
How, then, are we to account for this range of possibilities? 
The literature on anaphora already contains proposals which provide the 
formal machinery needed to account for the patterns observed. Rooth and Partee 
( 1 982) suggest that in certain cases, disjunctions introduce into a representation a 
single discourse referent, along with a disjunctive condition on that referent. 
Applying this proposal to the first sentence of (20) gives us the DRS in (30):  
(30) [ x ] [  [soprano(x)) v [alto(x)), will-sing(x) ] 
The disjunction induces the introduction of a single discourse referent, x. This 
same referent occurs in the sub-DRS representing each disjunct. As x is entered 
into the universe of the main DRS, it is accessible to pronouns in following 
sentences. This referent, though, represents neither a soprano nor an alto; it 
represents whoever sings. Any pronoun interpreted using this referent will 
therefore have this interpretation. Anaphora to one of the subordinate NPs is 
impossible because neither introduces its own discourse referent.6 
To explain the proper name case, we can adopt the assumption of Kamp 
and Reyle ( 1 993) that proper names and specific indefinites always induce the 
introduction of a discourse referent into the main DRS, even when they occur in 
a subordinate position. Assuming that the same applies to proper names inside a 
disjunction, the DRS for the first sentence of (26a) will be as in (3 1 ) : 
(3 1 )  ( x, y ] [  x = Jane, y = George, [will-sing(x)] v [will-sing(y)] ] 
Here, the NPs behave just as they would in the absence of disjunction. Each 
introduces its own discourse referent into the universe of the main DRS, and both 
of these referents are accessible to following pronouns. If a following pronoun is 
equated with x, it will be interpreted as anaphoric on Jane; if equated with y, it 
will be anaphoric on George. In this representation, there is no referent which 
represents the disjunction as a whole, and consequently no "whoever/whatever" 
reading is available for a following pronoun. 
By assuming that the representation of the examples with non-specific 
indefinites differs from that of examples with proper names and specific 
indefinites, we can provide a formal account of the various readings available. 
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But on what basis can we motivate this assumption? To see this, we need to 
consider what these representations really express. 
The introduction of a discourse referent into the universe of the main DRS 
represents the fact that the speaker--and by extension, the hearer--is committed to 
the existence of an individual satisfying certain properties. The properties are 
given by the conditions associated with that referent. Discourse referents 
introduced into the universe of a sub-DRS represent entities that play a role in the 
discourse, but to whose existence the speaker is not committed.7 
In asserting a disjunction which contains indefinites, there are a number of 
different commitments which a speaker might make with respect to the existence 
of individuals. Suppose that, on the basis of a particular experience, I say: 
(32) A soprano or an alto was singing. She had a lovely voice. 
This assertion is based on a belief about a particular individual--the individual who 
was singing. The disjunction indicates my uncertainty about the appropriate 
characterization of this individual. In making the assertion, I commit myself to 
the existence of only one individual. This is represented by the introduction into 
the main DRS of a single discourse referent. 
Similarly, suppose that I am telling you about a concert which is to take 
place. The concert is a regular event, at which either a soprano or an alto always 
sings. I have no knowledge about who the performer might be, but I do know 
that there will be a performer satisfying one of these descriptions. In these 
circumstances, my assertion: 
(33) A soprano or an alto will sing. She will have a lovely voice. 
again commits me to the existence of only one individual, while offering 
alternative possible characterizations of that individual. So again, the disjunction 
is appropriately represented by a single discourse referent in the universe of the 
main DRS, along with a disjunctive condition. 
Suppose, though, that I say: 
(34) Either Cleo or Maud will sing. 
By saying this, I commit myself to the existence of two separate individuals--Cleo 
and Maud--and indicate that one of them will satisfy the predicate given. There 
is no other way to understand the disjunction. To represent this commitment. we 
must introduce two distinct referents into the main DRS, one for Maud and one 
for Cleo. 
The use of a disjunction of specific indefinites carries just the same 
commitment. A specific indefinite is an indefinite whose descriptive content is 
such that an assertion containing this indefinite must be based on a belief about 
a particular individual, just like an assertion containing a proper name. An 
assertion of (28), repeated here, commits the speaker to the existence of 
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individuals satisfying each of the descriptions. Its representation must therefore 
include a discourse referent for each of these individuals. 
(28) The concert will be opened by a famous mezzo who started her career as 
a violist, or a young soprano who recently sang at the Met. 
The possibilities of external anaphora to NP disjunctions are therefore 
determined by the role these expressions play in introducing individuals into the 
discourse context. A disjunction of non-specific indefinites will, in general, serve 
to introduce a single individual under alternative characterizations. This is 
represented by introducing a single discourse referent into the main DRS. This 
referent is accessible to following pronouns, and gives rise to the 
"whoever/whatever" interpretation. On the other hand, disjunctions of proper 
names or specific indefinites introduce (at least) two individuals, and assert that 
(at least) one of them will satisfy the predicate given. This is represented by 
introducing a distinct referent for each NP into the main DRS. Each of these 
referents can be used to interpret a following pronoun, and will give rise to an 
anaphoric link to a particular subordinate NP. 
2. 2. Clausal Disjunction 
The pattern of anaphora to clausal disjunctions is very similar to what we have 
already seen. Clausal disjunctions which contain indefinites support external 
anaphora, but the pronoun is given a "whoever/whatever" interpretation (examples 
(35)-(37» . If the indefinites are replaced with proper names, or with specific 
indefinites, the "whoever/whatever" reading disappears, but, as with the NP 
disjunctions, the pronoun may be understood as anaphoric on a particular NP in 
one of the disjuncts (examples (38)-(40» . 
(35) For the final act, either a soprano will sing or an actress will perform a 
monologue. She will stand on that platform. 
(36) Either a squirrel has got into the attic, or a bird is building a nest up there. 
We' ll have to get it out. 
(37) Either Jane talked to a bass about this, or Cleo talked to a tenor. He was 
very upset. 
(38) Either Jane wil l  sing or Maud wi l l  play the piano. #Then she'll lead the 
audience in the national anthem. 
(39) Either a famous mezzo who started her career as a violist will sing, or a 
young pianist who won the Rubinstein competition a couple of years ago 
will play. #She ' l l  probably do several encores. 
(40) Either Jane wil l  sing or George will play the piano. HE is a very 
interesting performer. 
These disjunctive sentences serve to introduce individuals into the context 
in much the same way as the NP disjunctions do. The first sentence of (35) 
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presents two alternative situations, and asserts that (at least) one of them will come 
about. However, the sentence commits the speaker to the existence of only one 
individual, the performer. (If the disjunction is verified by the truth of the first 
disjunct, the speaker has no commitment to the existence of an actress.) The 
natural way to represent this sentence, then, is with the DRS in (4 1 ) :  
(4 1 )  [ x J [  [soprano(x), will-sing(x)] v [actress(x), will-perform-a­
monologue(x)] ] 
As in the case ofNP disjunction, this representation provides a single variable for 
the interpretation of following pronouns. This variable represents neither a 
soprano nor an actress, but the individual whose existence will satisfy the 
disjunctive condition. A pronoun interpreted using this variable will therefore be 
understood as "whoever performs. "  Note, though, that to derive this 
representation, we must suspend, or at least loosen, the novelty requirement on 
referents introduced by indefinites. I return to this point below. 
(40) also presents two alternative situations, but here, each alternative 
involves a distinct individual. The speaker of this sentence is committed to the 
existence of both Jane and George, and so its representation must include 
discourse referents for both. The DRS for this sentence is shown in (42). 
(42) [ x, y ) [ x = Jane, y = George, [will-sing(x)] v [will-play(y)] ] 
Not all clausal disjunctions containing indefinites support external 
anaphora, even with a "whoever/whatever" reading. When the indefinites are in 
the sentence comment, the felicity of the anaphora is often considerably reduced. 
Consider, for example, (43)-(45) :  
(43) Either Cleo has baked a cake, or Henry has made a trifle. #They're both 
excellent cooks, so I 'm sure it' s delicious. 
(44) Either a soprano will sing an aria, or an actress will recite a monologue. 
a. Then she will lead the audience in the national anthem. 
b. ?It'll be in German. 
(45) Either an aria will be sung by a soprano, or a monologue will be recited 
by an actress. 
a. #Then she will lead the audience in the national anthem. 
b. It'll be in German. 
This is not, however, a straightforward SUbject/object asymmetry, as illustrated by 
the felicity of (46) and (47) : 
(46) Either George will send an e-mail, or Maud will write a letter. It'll contain 
all of the relevant information. 
(47) Jane had a terrible time getting to Boston. Either she had rented a car, or 
Henry had lent her a truck, but it broke down on the way. 
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The reason for this asymmetry is, I think, that a disjunctive sentence is often not 
interpreted as presenting alternative characterizations of indeflnites in the 
comment. (43), intuitively, is not about a single dessert; its function is not to 
introduce some entity (a dessert), but to talk about Cleo and Henry. It is not, 
though, impossible for indeflnites in the comment to function in this way. (46) 
is naturally understood as giving information about a single communication, which 
will be either a letter or an e-mail. Consequently (46), but not (43), allows the 
anaphora. 
As in the case of proper names and specific indefinites, the absence of a 
"whoever/whatever" reading in examples like (43) is expressed formally by 
introducing separate discourse referents for each indeflnite. The impossibility of 
anaphora to the subordinate NPs indicates, though, that these referents cannot be 
introduced into the main DRS. This accords with the observation that the 
referents do not represent entities to whose existence the speaker is committed. 
In this case, each referent is introduced into the universe of the sub-DRS 
representing the disjunct in which it occurs. The complete DRS for (43) is given 
in (48): 
(48) [ x, y ] [  x = Cleo, y = Henry, [ [u] [cake(u), x baked u] v [v] [trifle(v), y 
made v] ] ] 
2. 2. 1 .  Modal Subordination Readings 
There is one other case of external anaphora to a clausal disjunction containing 
indefinites which is not available with NP disjunction. This is the case of modal 
subordination, as discussed by Roberts ( 1 989). An example is given in (49) : 
(49) Either a soprano will sing or an actress will perform a monologue. But 
SHE would have to give a really impressive performance. 
The pronoun she (which, I think, must be stressed), is understood as anaphoric on 
the indefinite an actress, although this indefinite is not specific. But the sentence 
containing the pronoun is, as a whole, subordinate to the second disjunct, meaning 
something like : "If it' s the actress who performs, then she will have to give a 
really impressive performance."s This implicit conditional is understood as being 
conjoined to the second disjunct. 
In (48), the indefinites in each disjunct introduce their referents into the 
universe of the sub-DRS representing that disjunct. Modal subordination can be 
accounted for formally by allowing any indefinite in a clausal disjunction to 
introduce a referent in this way. This would produce the DRS in (50) as the 
representation of the first sentence of (49) : 
(50) 1 ] [ [[x] [soprano(x), will-sing(x)]] v [[y] [actress(y), will-perform-a­
monologue(y)]] ] 
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Let us assume (more or less following Roberts) that the subordination of the 
second sentence in the sequence to the second disjunct of (50) is expressed by 
conjoining the two. The second sentence thus becomes part of this disjunct, and 
not part of the main DRS. The definites in this sentence will thus be subordinate 
to the referent y in the universe of the second disjunct, and so can be interpreted 
via this referent. Consequently, they are interpreted as anaphoric on an actress. 
Recall that the first sentence of (49) also supports external anaphora with 
a "whoever/whatever" reading. To account for this, I argued above that the 
appropriate DRS for this sentence is that shown in (5 1 ), repeated from above: 
(5 1 )  [ x ] [  [soprano(x), will-sing(x)] v [actress(x), will-perform-a­
monologue(x)] ] 
(50) and (5 1 )  are truth-conditionally equivalent; both will be verified in the same 
models. They are not, of course, dynamically equivalent. (5 1 )  allows external 
anaphora, but (50) does not. (50), on the other hand, can quite straightforwardly 
be derived compositionally from the syntactic representation of the disjunction, 
whereas (5 1 )  cannot. To derive (50), we map each syntactic disjunct into a sub­
DRS of the disjunctive condition, and then reduce each clause following the 
standard DRT construction rules. To derive (5 1 ), we would need to modify these 
rules, including, as I mentioned earlier, the novelty requirement for indefinites. 
Consequently, I take (50) to be the default, and basic, representation for the 
sentence, from which (5 1 )  can be derived. Derivation of the reduced 
representation will follow from recognition that the sentence is being used to 
introduce a single individual under alternative characterizations. There is thus a 
significant pragmatic input at this stage. This pragmatic factor explains the 
variability in speaker judgements about external anaphora to clausal disjunctions. 
Some speakers are much more willing to accept this kind of anaphora than others. 
Similarly, some examples are much more acceptable than others with identical 
structure but different content. In general, the more obviously the NP predicates 
are related, the more acceptable the anaphora is. Here, for instance, is an example 
structurally identical to the first sentence of (49) which does not seem to support 
external anaphora at all : 
(52) Either a car just backfired, or a gun went off. 
a. . . .#It must have been a small one. 
b. . . .#1 think it belongs to George. 
The problem seems to be that it is quite unnatural to generalize over cars and 
guns, and so to understand the sentence as offering alternative characterizations of 
a single object. 
2. 3. VP Disjunction 
Anaphora to VP disjunction, as might be expected, follows the same pattern as 
anaphora to clausal disjunctions where the relevant NPs form part of the sentence 
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comment. It is easier to fmd unacceptable examples than acceptable ones; the 
acceptable cases are those where the VPs provide alternative characterizations of 
a single entity. 
(53) Jane will either buy a bicycle or borrow a motorbike. #11'11 be really useful 
for getting around. 
(54) Maud will either make a trifle or buy a cake. #11'11 be great for dessert. 
(5 5) Jane either bought a bicycle or borrowed a bicycle. It' s in the garage. 
All of the examples are improved by deaccenting the NP, and concomitantly 
stressing the verb. In general, deaccenting indicates that an NP is "old 
information". In (53), for instance, the effect of deaccenting is to indicate that it 
is taken for granted that Jane will acquire some vehicle or other, and what is of 
interest is how this will happen. With deaccenting, it is easier to understand the 
sentence as giving alternative characterizations of the vehicle. 
I assume that, as with clausal disjunction, VP disjunctions trigger the 
introduction of a disjunctive condition, with each disjunct being mapped to one 
sub-DRS, and the indefinites introducing their discourse referents into the universe 
of the relevant sub-DRS. The DRS for the first sentence of (53) is given in (56) : 
(56) [ x  J[ x = Jane, [y] [bicycle(y), x will buy y] v [z] [motorbike(z), x will 
borrow z] ] 
Again like the clausal disjunctions, if a sentence containing a VP disjunction is 
understood as giving alternative characterizations of a single entity, the 
representation may be modified to reflect this, producing, for (53), the DRS in 
(57) :  
(57) [ x ,  yJ [ x = Jane, [bicycle(y), x will buy y] v [motorbike(y), x wi l l  
borrow y]  ] .  
2. 4. External Anaphora: Summary 
(i) External anaphora with "whoever/whatever" reading 
Produced by anaphora to a discourse referent introduced into the universe of the 
main DRS, and occurring on both sides of the disjunctive condition. A disjunction 
gives rise to such a referent when it is understood to introduce a single individual 
under alternative characterizations. 
(ii) External anaphora to a subordinate NP 
Possible only with proper names and specific indefinites, which always introduce 
a discourse referent into the universe of the main DRS. Disjunctions containing 
NPs of this type are always understood as introducing multiple individuals, and 
asserting that (at least) one of them will satisfy the given predicate. 
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(iii) No external anaphora 
Results when the referent introduced by each indefinite NP is introduced into the 
universe of the sub-DRS representing the disjunct in which it occurs. This is the 
default representation for indefinites in clausal and VP disjunctions, from which 
reduced representations as specified in (i) can be derived.9 These default 
representations do support external anaphora in the case of modal subordination, 
where the sentence containing the pronoun is conjoined to one of the disjuncts, 
making the referents in its universe accessible to the pronoun. 
3. Conclusion 
As I said at the outset, distinct accounts are needed for internal and external 
anaphora. Both accounts, however, make reference to the function of disjunction 
itself. Recognition of this function is particularly important in the analysis of 
internal anaphora, where it is not the anaphora itself which causes infelicity, but 
the failure of the disjunction to present "true alternatives" when an anaphoric link 
is formed across disjuncts. Previous analyses have attempted to account for these 
data by explaining what is wrong with the anaphora in the bad examples. The 
explanation has been very hard to find. The reason is that we have been asking 
the wrong question. When we ask the right one--what is wrong with the 
disjunction?--a quite natural answer is forthcoming. 
Endnotes 
• For their help and encouragement in writing this paper, I would like to thank 
Molly Diesing, Sally McConnell-Ginet, Zoltan Gendler Szabo and Sandro Zucchi. 
Thanks also to the participants of SALT VI for helpful and interesting discussion. 
I .  In this paper, I discuss only internal anaphora between clausal disjuncts. 
However, similar phenomena arise with disjunctions of other categories. 
2. # indicates infelicity of a sentence, or of a sentence in a particular sentence 
sequence. 
3. Jeff Pelletier has brought to my attention a similar claim made in Hurford 
( 1 974). Hurford claims that "the joining of two sentences by or is unacceptable 
if one sentence entails the other; otherwise, the use of or is acceptable ."  Hurford' s  
formulation i s  problematic i n  two respects. First, there are sentences i n  which or 
is not used to express disjunction; these sentences are not subject to the disjunction 
constraint. Second, as I will illustrate below, Hurford' s biconditional formulation 
is too strong. 
4. The idea of incorporating an E-type strategy into a dynamic framework does 
not originate with me. Chierchia ( 1 995) assumes both a pragmatic E-type strategy 
as well as dynamic binding. Kamp and Reyle ( 1 993) use a very similar strategy 
to that which I propose as part of their account of plural anaphora to 
quantificational NPs. DRT accounts of anaphora which make use of 
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accommodation (see, for instance, Kadmon ( 1 987) and Roberts ( 1 989» likewise 
involve very similar mechanisms. 
5. I hope at some later point to show that these accessibility relations follow from 
general principles governing information representation and update. For now, I 
follow Kamp and Reyle in stipulating them. 
6. Recall that I characterized the E-type strategy proposed above as a rescue 
strategy, which comes into play when there is no accessible referent. Here there 
is an accessible referent, so there is no "license" to use the E-t)'lle strategy to 
construct an alternative interpretation. 
7. Cf. the distinction made in Roberts ( 1989) between factual and non-factual 
modalities. 
8. As Roberts points out, the subordination is indicated by the past tense modal. 
9. We could make the same assumption about NP disjunctions. At this stage, I 
remain agnostic on this point. 
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